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INTRODUCTION 
Increasing public transit ridership has emerged as a primary goal of policy makers 
seeking to comply with legislation such as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. There are a number of policies 
that researchers and decision-makers are presently examining for their potential to divert 
automobile drivers to transit. This report assesses the implementation of various parking 
strategies as a means of increasing transit patronage for the work trip. 
A key connection between parking and transit ridership lies in the supply and price 
of parking. Where parking is scarce-typically in high-density areas-prices are normally 
charged and transit ridership levels are relatively high. Where parking is ample-typically 
in low-density areas-there is usually no charge for parking. Consequently, commuters 
have little incentive not to drive and thus transit ridership levels are low. In fact, about 90 
percent of all customer and employee parking in the U.S. is free ( J) and, not su rprisingly, 
87 percent of worktrips and 91 percent of all trips are made by automobile (2). 
Despite this apparently simple connection between parking and transit ridership, 
there are complex factors at play in metropolitan areas that caution against a blanket 
recommendation of an across-the-board increase in parking prices as a means of increasing 
transit ridership. This paper considers the issues surrounding the relationship between 
parking and transit ridership and provides recommendations for policy-makers who seek 
to include parking strategies as part of an overall transportation pol icy aimed at reducing 
automobile travel. 
METHODOLOGY 
The Eight Parking Strategies 
Eight parking strategies are assessed along five dimensions. The strategies are 
divided into two categories: price based and nonprice based. The price-based strategies 
include three parking p1icing approaches: 
• Increasing the Price of Parking, Based on a Tax on Revenues 
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• Increasing the Price of Parking, Based on a Tax on Parking Spaces 
• Cashing-Out Employer-Provided Parking 
1985 travel data from the Portland, Oregon, region was used to estimate the 
impact of different parking strategies on mode share. The Portland destination- and 
mode-choice models for home-based work purposes were reestimated to incorporate 
parking costs explicitly. These analytical techniques did not allow for precise estimates of 
specific parking pricing strategies, because of the inability of the models to separate 
parking price from other travel price effects. A chief factor contributing to this inability is 
the use of zonal average parking prices-the zonal averages are strongly influenced by the 
large number of zero and missing prices resulting from the fact that so many commuters 
do not pay for parking. This research relied on a number of alternative definitions of cost 
and distance variables with different values in an attempt to find the best model that could 
include a separate parking cost variable. These methodological drawbacks indicate that 
while the results of the Portland destination- and mode-choice model suggest tendencies, 
they should be interpreted with caution. 
This paper also discusses two other price-based strategies, although their modal 
effects were not modeled: 
• Expanding Meters and Accompanying Residential Permit Programs 
• Parking Impact Fees 
Finally, three nonprice-based strategies, whose effects also were not modeled, are 
included in the discussion: 
• Changes in Zoning Ordinances to Restrict Parking Supply 
• Shared Parking 
• Transportation Demand Management approaches, consisting of 
• satellite parking-shuttle lots 
• preferential parking for carpoolers 
• transit incentive programs 
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Five Dimensions of Assessment 
The parking strategies were assessed across the following five dimensions: 
• effectiveness, in terms of increasing regionwide transit worktrip share, as 
estimated by the destination- and mode-choice modeling mentioned above 
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• scope, in terms of targeting peak-hour drivers (temporal scope), specific types 
of driver or trip (functional scope), and specific geographic areas (spatial 
scope) 
• political feasibility, in terms of stakeholders made worse or better off; the 
extent to which revenues might be used to finance mechanisms for 
compensating those made worse off; and the extent to which the strategy 
results in both short- and long-tenn unintended negative consequences, such as 
spillover parking or decentralization 
• economic efficiency, in terms of correcting failures in the overall 
transportation market and in terms of avoiding the creation of additional 
inefficiencies or negative externalities (such as inadequate parking supply) 
• ease of administration and implementa tion, in te1ms of cost; technological 
requirements; and necessary reform or creation of new procedures, agencies, 
institutions, and legislation 
The strategies were assessed using a qualitative assessment ratings, such as "high," 
"moderate", and " low." Where quantitative modeling underlay the assessment, the 
qualitative ratings were based on the quantitative findings (for example, with respect to 
strategies' effectiveness in increasing worktrip transit share). Otherwise, the ratings are 
derived from a review of the Literature and from five case studies conducted to provide 
illustrations of some of the strategies that policy-makers are currently implementing 
throughout the U.S.: 
1. a study of parking policy and travel behavior in twenty metropolitan areas and 
their central cities, based on surveys of parking officials ( 3 )and on data from 
the 1990 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (2) and the Federal 
Urban Mass Transportation Administration (4) 
2. a study of parking policy in eleven "edge cities," based on surveys of parking 
officials in those areas 
3. a case study of parking policy in Portland, Oregon, which has been 
implementing a wide range of parking strategies for over two decades, based 
on interviews with key informants and on archival records (5) 
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4. a case study of parking policy in Midtown Atlanta, a new development 
occuITing outside of the downtown area, in which zoning codes do not require 
developers to provide any parking (6) 
5. a study of transportation demand management and parking procedures at 
several universities and hospitals, based on interviews with key informants 
ASSESSMENT OF PRICE-BASED PARKING STRATEGIES 
This section provides an assessment of five price-based parking strategies. The 
next section presents the assessment of the three nonprice-based parking strategies. Table 
I provides a summary of these two sections. 
Increasing the Price of Parking, Based on a Tax on Revenues 
One way to stimulate pricing of parking is to tax the revenues that parking 
providers generate. The economic rationale for this tax is to impose on motorists the 
social cost of driving, in addition to the private cost. This strategy would target providers 
who presently realize revenues, i.e., those in the central business district (CBD) and other 
high-density areas. Parking providers located in the suburbs and other low-density areas 
do not charge for parking and hence do not realize revenues. 
This type of parking tax is estimated to have a moderate effect on increasing transit 
ridership. A 20-percent tax on revenues is estimated to result in a 7-percent increase in 
transit share for home-based worktrips regionwide, although the effects of this strategy 
would vary according to whether the price increase is occurring in an area with high 
transit service or in an area with low transit service. The effects would also vary, of 
course, depending on the size of the tax. 
Scope 
The temporal scope of this strategy is broad, since it is not aimed specifically at 
peak-hour drivers. This strategy would affect only those drivers who currently pay to 
park, making the functional scope fairly narrow. Its spatial scope is also fairly naITow 
because the strategy would apply only to those denser locations where parking is already 
priced. 
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Political Feasibility 
This strategy is expected to have moderate political feasibility. In general, 
travelers would benefit from a decrease in travel and parking congestion resu lting from a 
moderate increase in transit share. Those made worse off include auto users who cannot 
afford the price increase, e.g., low-income people who drive to and park in the CBD; and 
employers, retailers, and service providers located in the CBD, who might protest 
additional constraints on parking. 
Depending on the level of the tax, policy makers could use Lhe revenues from this 
strategy to compensate those made worse off if the administrative costs associated with 
identifying and compensating those individuaJs and groups did not outweigh the benefits 
of doing so. 
Because CBD films and commuters would be at a disadvantage relative to the 
suburbs-where this strategy would not apply-this approach could stimulate 
decentralization over the long term, despite the relatively superior transit service in the 
CBD. Another problem is that there would almost certainly be spillover parking into 
unmetered on-street spaces. 
Efjkiency 
s 
Because this strategy is likely to result in spillover parking-as well as in Jong-term 
differential impacts between the CBD and the suburbs-this tax has low to moderate 
economk efficiency. This strategy's economic efficiency could be funher compromised if 
the tax is set too low or too high. If set too high, it would cause a shift from single-
occupancy vehicle (SOY) travel in the short term but encourage decentralization in the 
long term. If the tax is set too low, the modal impact would be slight and the only impact 
would be the resulting revenues. 
Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration 
Half of the cities included in the survey of parking policy in twenty central cities 
impose a tax on parking revenues, and in about half of these, the tax is just an application 
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of the regular sales tax. The tax on parking revenues appears to be primarily for revenue 
generation and is largely unrelated to transportation policy in general. Indeed, cities are 
not currently taxing parking revenues at a rate high enough to stimulate the pricing of 
parking or cause a mode shift. 
The ease of administration of this strategy is moderate to high. While little new 
technology would be needed, the approach does require that a monetary transaction 
occur, so mechanisms need to be in place for handling that transaction. Some new 
agencies and procedures may be necessary, as well, for levying, collecting, and enforcing 
compliance with the tax. 
Increasing the Price of Parking, Based on a Tax on Parking Spaces 
Another way of stimulating parking pricing is by taxing actual parking spaces, 
rather than revenues. Such an approach would affect all parking, not just that in high-
density areas where parking is presently priced. 
Effectiveness 
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In the CBD, where there are few opportunities for spillover parking, parking 
providers are likely to pass a large percentage of the tax on to drivers; the effect on 
increasing transit share should be high- a $1 tax per space is estimated to result in a 22-
percent increase in transit share for the home-based worktrip regionwide. In the central 
city and suburban business districts, where there are more opportunities for spillover 
parking, providers wiJ1 probably pass less of the tax on to drivers; the effect on transit 
would be relatively low, particularly if the available transit service is not of very high 
quality. In business districts outside of the CBD, travelers may be more inclined to switch 
to carpooling rather than transit. 
Scope 
This strategy is broader in its aim than the tax on parking revenues. Although it 
might affect a larger percentage of peak-hour drivers, it is not aimed specifically at that 
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group. Instead, it would impact all drivers who park in the CBD or other central city or 




Th_is strategy is expected to have low political feasibility. Those whom this 
strategy makes worse or better off are similar to those whom the tax on parking revenues 
would affect, except on a broader basis: they would incJude all travelers to central city 
and suburban business districts as well as to the CBD, where the parking providers could 
pass the tax on to drivers. The impact would also be more extensive, and, thus, this 
strategy would be more effective in reducing SOV share and increasing transit share. 
Therefore, while this strategy would make those who benefit from reductions in 
congestion would much better off than under the previous strategy, it wou Id make those 
who cannot afford the price increase much worse off. In addition, the differential effect 
resulting from variations in density would impact drivers parking in high-density areas 
more strongly than those in low-density areas. The primary negative impact would be on 
parking providers in low-density areas, who are unable to pass the tax on to motorists and 
who therefore have to absorb it. 
Like the tax on parking revenues, this strategy may stimulate decentralization over 
the long term, as CBD employees and firms might find suburban locations more attractive, 
though this effect may be offset if films have to absorb a larger proportion of the tax in 
such areas. Another drawback to this approach is that it would result in spillover parking 
onto unmetered on-street spaces. 
Efficiency 
Tills strategy is broad in scope, would result in the additional extemality of 
spillover parking, and is likely to stimulate decentralization over the long term. Thus, its 
economic efficiency is low. If the tax is too hlgh in magnitude, the resulting SOV 
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reduction could compromise efficiency by creating more distortions than it would correct. 
If the tax is too low, it would have little modal effect. 
Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration 
The case studies also illustrate potential problems with a tax on parking spaces. 
None of the twenty surveyed cities levies a per-space tax. There are two possible 
explanations for this. One is that, unlike a tax on parking revenues, a tax on parking 
spaces would not be part of an exjsting sales tax; thus, this strategy would require a new 
tax. Implementation jrnpediments might also arise because of the differences in incidence 
between the central city and the suburbs: parking providers may be more likely to pass a 
tax on off-street spaces on to drivers in the high-density CBD but may be more likely to 
absorb the tax in the low-density suburbs. 
The ease of administration of this strategy is low. This tax would require new 
legislation; existing legislation authorizing a sales tax would not be adequate, because this 
tax would not be based on a monetary transaction. Implementation of this tax would also 
require new agencies and procedures for counting spaces and levying, collecting, and 
enforcing compliance. 
Cashing-Out Employer-Provided Parking 
Cashing-out employer-provided parking is a strategy whereby employers would 
give their employees the cash equivalent of any parking benefit provided, and employees 
could then either spend that cash toward paying for the parking (rather than continuing to 
receive it free) or spend it toward any other purpose, including transit. Current legislation 
limits cashing-out to employers who lease parking, because it is easier to impute a cash 
value to that parking than to parking that the employer owns. The cash-out amount is 
also limited only to those employees to whom employers presently offer parking, not to all 
employees. 
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Effectiveness 
Some studies have estimated very optimistic effects on transit as a result of 
cashing-out strategies. These studjes, however, have focused on the estimated impacts for 
a given site, such as an individual employer (7). The simulations conducted for this paper 
estimated effects on worktrip transit ridership for the entire Portland metropolitan area. 
The results suggest that a 9-percent increase in regional transit ridership for the home-
based workt:rip would result from a $3-per-day cash-out applied in the CBD and near-
CBD and a $1-per-day casb-out applied in regional activity centers. 
Scope 
Cashing-out targets only peak-hour drivers; thus, the temporal scope is narrow. If 
cashing-out is limited to leased parkjng, the functional scope is also narrow, because this 
strategy is aimed specifically at commuters who park in leased spaces. The spatial scope 
is moderate to narrow, because the strategy would apply to all individual employment sites 
within a region, although onJy whose where employers lease parking. If cashing-out is not 
Jimjted to leased parkjng, its functional and spatial scopes would be broader. 
Political Feasibility 
Cashing-out has moderate political feasibility. The fact that most proposals for 
cashing out focus on parkjng that the employer leases and that most leased parking is in 
the CBD-where market rates are also their highest- has some impact on which groups 
this strategy makes worse or better off. All employees to whom employers offer the cash-
out option would be better off because they would have a choice they did not have before. 
Those who would benefit from the slight reduction in congestion are also among 
those whom cashing-out makes better off, even if they are not among those who have the 
cash-out option. Assuming that tills strategy would apply only to leased, and therefore 
CBD parking, these beneficiaries would include travelers to the CBD whose time is highly 
valued, transit interests, and local officials concerned with improved access to the CBD. 
Because of better transit service in the CBD, cashing-out may encourage centralization 
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over the long run, and local officials and CBD retailers may benefit from this 
centralization. Employers who have to cash-out employees to whom they previously 
offered free parking but who did not use it (e.g., transit users) constitute the primary 
group made worse off; the admjnistrative costs associated with cashing-out may also be 
disadvantageous to employers, as would the effect of increasing salaries to compensate 
employees for the loss of the tax exemption. 
No revenues would result from cashing-out with which to offset the negative 
impacts to those whom cashing-out would make worse off; cashing-out is, in fact, 
designed to be revenue neutral. 
Efficiency 
JO 
Cashing-out is more efficient than the previous two strategies. It is more narrow 
in scope, although it still affects only a small percentage of all commuters. Although some 
spillover parking may result, cashing-out is designed to generate few other negative 
externalities. Its economic efficiency is thus moderate. 
Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration 
Although currently in place on a limited demonstration basis in the Los Angeles 
region, none of the cities surveyed for this research has implemented cashing-out. 
However, a parking advisory commjttee in Portland identified current federal tax 
legislation as the primary impediment to cashing-out, because under a cash-out program, 
employees who choose the previously tax-free parking option would now be taxed on the 
value of the parking (8). In addition, as of 1996, employers may deduct $165 per month 
per employee parking benefit, but only $65 per month per employee transit or rideshai"ing 
benefit. These problems result in negligible incentives for commuters to switch from SOV 
commuting to another mode. 
This strategy is expected to have a moderate ease of administration. While little 
new technology or institutional change would be required, employers would have to take 
on the task of administering the cash-out program. 
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Expanding Meters and Accompanying Residential Permit Programs 
This strategy would extend meters outside of the CBD, to other business districts 
within the central city and suburbs. It would also involve instituting residential permit 
programs in areas surrounding the metered locations to ward off spillover parking from 
metered spaces into nonmetered residential zones. Residents would pay a small annual fee 
to purchase a sticker for their automobile, and visitors may park in the zone for a limited 
amount of time, such as two hours. Others are not allowed to park in the permit zone. 
Effectiveness 
This strategy was not modeled and its effects were not quantified. However, it is 
expected to result in a low to moderate effect on transit ridership, with the greatest impact 
being in areas with high-quality transit service. This strategy is best suited to areas 
experiencing problems with spillover parking, such as locations close to downtown or 
other places where off-street parking is priced. 
Scope 
In areas where spillover parking is a particular problem, on-street meters and 
permit programs target all-day parkers, and thus the temporal scope is broad (peak-hour 
drivers are not singled out). Overall, however, the approach is aimed at employees, so the 
functional scope is narrower. The spatial scope of this strategy is also narrow, as it is 
applied in specific districts and neighborhoods. 
Political Feasibility 
This strategy has moderate political feasibility. Those made better off by this 
strategy include travelers on shopping or personal business trips, who are more likely to 
find on-street spaces not filled by employee parking. Neighborhood residents also benefit 
by not having to compete with employees for on-street spaces. Some residents, however, 
may object to the annual fee, although it is usually small, and to the short time period for 
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visitors. Transit interests would benefit from the modest increases in ridership, as would 
local officials concerned about improving access to the CBD. 
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Although retailers and service providers may benefit from a greater number of 
customers due to turnover of metered on-street spaces-and particularly higher income 
customers, who are more likely to pay to park-business owners tend to be the most 
vociferous opponents of permit and meter programs. Despite proponents' assurances that 
firms would not suffer financial losses and that in fact business conditions might even 
improve, most businesses oppose any measures that would restrict their customers' 
access. Others who object to these programs are long-term parkers, particularly 
employees, who attempt to spiU over from nearby priced parking; other opponents are 
those who continue to park and pay, even though they find the fees a financial hardship. 
Where parking is in high demand (e.g., in high-density activity centers), significant 
revenues can result with which to compensate those whom this strategy makes worse off. 
Policy-makers could use these revenues as Donald Shoup suggests, that is, to create 
"benefit districts," where the city funnels revenues back into the district in the form of 
benefits such as improved landscaping and lighting, bicycle and pedestrian amenities, and 
improved transit (9 ). 
Efficiency 
This strategy has moderate to high efficiency, depending on where officials 
implement it. If they implement meters and permits in high-density areas with excess 
demand for parking, the programs will be more efficient than if implemented in Iow-
density locations with excess parking supply. The fact that this strategy expressly 
addresses the externality of spillover parking also enhances its efficiency. If officials set 
meter and permit rates to inefficiently high (or low) levels, however, efficiency may be 
compromised. 
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Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration 
The survey of parking policy in twenty central cities reveals that parking meters 
are employed outside of the CBD in most, but not all, of the cities. In most of the cities, 
residential permit programs complement on-street metering outside of the CBD. 
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However, in five of the cities where most of the meters are located outside of the CBD, no 
residential pe1mit program is in place, suggesting that spil1over problems are either not 
serious or remain unaddressed. On the other ha.nd, it may be that the primary purpose of 
the metering program is revenue generation rather than control of parking supply or 
stimulation of pricing. 
As with parking taxes, a program of extended parking meters and residential 
permits is part of an overall tra.nsportation policy in only a few cities. Portland is an 
example of a city that is endeavoring to tie parking policy to an overall transportation 
policy. Portland has been trying to extend meters and permits into the Lloyd District, a 
commercial a.nd retail area just across the Willamette River from the CBD. A district task 
force has proposed a package that includes parking meters for on-street parking and 
permit programs for nearby residential neighborhoods. Area businesses have indicated 
their willingness to support the package only if it also includes certain transit 
improvements such as extension of the city's "Fareless Square" (presently confined to the 
CBD) and more direct bus service. The city has approved the plan, but due to a lack of 
political support, has not yet implemented it. 
There are other districts in Portland whose plans also include recommendations for 
extending meter and permit zones. The political process involved with implementing these 
measures in all of these districts is proving to be complex. In the six years since the plans 
were first injtiated, no additional meters or residential permit zones have yet been 
implemented. Businesses are reluctant to support extension of metering without 
significant-and expensive-transit improvements; meanwhile, in Portland, as in many 
cities, the legal process for implementing residential permit programs is very involved. 
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The ease of administration of this strategy is low to moderate. Not only are 
extensive surveys required, but both residential permit and on-street metering programs 
require monitoring and enforcement. Although fees and fines can contribute to city 
revenues, they require that mechanisms be in place for collection and dissemination. 
Parking Impact Fees 
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Parking impact fees are a subset of road impact fees; that is, in some situations the 
number of parking spaces that a new development provides may be taken as a proxy for 
the impact that development will have on the transportation system. Authorities would 
impose a one-time fee on developers, which is meant to cover the costs the parking 
creates for the transportation system as a whole. Impact fees might provide an incentive 
for developers to provide only the amount of parking actually needed. 
Effectiveness 
The researchers expect that the full effect of impact fees would not be apparent in 
the short term and is thus difficult to estimate. The effect would probably be very low in 
the short term and somewhat greater in the long term. In any case, impact fees would 
affect areas of new development only. 
Scope 
Impact fees would have a broad temporal scope because they would not 
specifically target peak-hour drivers. Their functional scope is more narrow because they 
would affect only a small percentage of drivers or trip types. Because they would be 
aimed specifically at parking in areas of new development, their spatial scope is also fairly 
narrow. 
Political Feasibility 
The political feasibility of parking impact fees is moderate to high, as "making 
development pay its own way" is currently a popular notion among policy-makers and the 
public. Those whom this strategy would make better off are those individuals in and users 
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of already-developed areas, who would benefit from increasing the cost of new 
development. This would include slow-growth advocates, as well as the authority 
collecting the revenues. Those made worse off would include owners of newly developed 
land, who would have to absorb the fee if they could not pass it on in the form of higher 
prices. Users of newly developed areas would be worse off, as well, if the developers and 
businesses passed the impact fee on in the form of a high parking fees or higher prices for 
goods and services. 
Although this strategy would yield revenues to the authority imposing the impact 
fee, in general, states may not use an impact fee for any purpose other than "to meet the 
service needs directly attributable to the project bearing its cost" (10). In addition, impact 
fee revenues "must be segregated until used and must be expended in timely fashion 
(generally, within five or six years) for the purposes originally designated." These 
restrictions, known in judicial terms as " rational nexus," have been applied by the courts of 
most states. The implication is that there may be strict limitations on how and when the 
revenues from impact fees may be spent. It may not be possible to divert these revenues 
to mechanisms, such as transit improvements, for compensating those negatively impacted 
by the fees. This issue could possibly detract from the political acceptability of parking 
impact fees, if that acceptability hinges on using revenues for compensatory purposes. 
Over the long te1m, impact fees may stimulate more compact development in areas 
of new growth; compact development is one common response in areas with restricted 
parking supply, which, although desirable to many environmentalists and slow-growth 
advocates, might in tum have the unintended consequence of increased congestion. As 
with many other strategies, impact fees may also engender spillover parking. 
Efficiency 
Parking impact fees are likely to have low to moderate efficiency. Such fees are a 
very indirect means of influencing modal behavior. In addition, if the fees result in 
inadequate parking supply, they may engender spillover parking. However, insofar as 
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existing parking supply standards might be too high, parking impact fees would stimulate a 
more efficient supply of parking. 
Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration 
While none of the case studies revealed any examples of parking impact fees, 
existing instances of road impact fees provide illustrations of the implementation 
challenges involved with parking impact fees, particularly with respect to the "rational 
nexus" limitations discussed above. 
The ease of administration of parking impact fees is moderate. Some institutional 
and legal change would probably be required for the implementation and collection of the 
fee. The fact that the fee is a one-time-only charge lessens any potential administrative 
difficulty. Ease of administration would be significantly compromised if legislative 
changes were necessary to modify the rational nexus provisions that limit the use of 
revenues resulting from impact fees. 
ASSESSMENT OF NONPRICE-BASED PARKING STRATEGIES 
This section addresses three nonprice-based parking strategies, which, along with 
those strategies discussed above, are summarized in Table I. 
Changes in Zoning Ordinances to Restrict Parking Supply 
This study evaluates three types of modifications to zoning ordinances: decreasing 
minimum parking requirements, imposing maximum parking requirements, and issuing 
conditional-use permits. 
Because ordinances typically base minimum parking requirements on the amount 
of parking that would be required during times of peak use-during holiday shopping 
season, for example, at a mall-they often result in excess supply during nonpeak periods. 
Zoning ordinances often contain minimum parking requirements to ensure adequate 
parking supply and to discourage spillover parking during peak periods, but result in 
excess supply the rest of the time ( 11 ). Thus, one way to modify zoning ordinances is to 
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decrease these minimums to bring them closer to typical nonpeak needs. Another 
approach is for zoning codes to impose parking maximums, which would cap the amount 
of parking developers may provide. Alternatively, municipalities may grant conditional-
use permits allowing a developer to provide an amount of parking that is below the 
minimum stated in the zoning code. Frequently, in such scenarios, cities require 
developers to furnish support for alternative transport modes or pay money into a city " in-
lieu fund" in exchange for being allowed to provide below the minimum. Cities also 
implement in-lieu funds when the provision of on-site off-street parking is not feasible. In 
these cases, the in-lieu funds are typicaJly used to subsidize municipal lots or stmctures, as 
well as alternative transportation modes. 
Effectiveness 
Effects on transit share would vary greatly according to local conditions and would 
differ in the intermediate and long term. These strategies are all estimated to have very 
low effects in the short term, with only slightly higher in the long term. 
Scope 
Changes in zoning ordinances would not specifica11y target peak-hour dlivers; 
hence, the temporal scope is quite broad. Their functional scope is more narrow, because 
these strategies would impact only a small percentage of drivers and trip types. Finally , 
because these change would be confined to areas of new growth, their spatial scope would 
also be fairly naffow. 
Political Feasibility 
These approaches are expected to have moderate to high political feasibility. In 
general , developers benefit from reduced costs associated with providing less parking. 
Those whom such strategies might make worse off include travelers, if the new parking 
supply turns out to be too low, as well as firms that might suffer business losses as a result 
of inadequate parking supply. 
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Of the three strategies in this category, only conditional-use permits would 
generate revenues, and, although these could be used to support alternative transport 
modes, it would be difficult to identify and compensate directly any individuals or groups 
made worse off. 
Like parking impact fees, changes in zoning ordinances would affect areas of new 
development only. This fact restricts these strategies to the suburbs and other areas of 
new growth and may thus be perceived as punitive in those areas. In addition, where they 
are in effect, they may stimulate slightly more compact development. If either minimums 
or maximums end up resulting in inadequate supply, spillover may resu lt. 
Efficiency 
Changes in zoning ordinances are likely to have low to moderate economic 
efficiency for the same reasons as parking impact fees: although the temporal scope is 
generally broad, existing inefficiencies due to oversupply of parking may be corrected. If 
the changes result in an inefficient undersupply of parking, however, economic efficiency 
is not improved. 
Implementation. Issues and Ease of Administration 
The case study of parking policy in Midtown Atlanta is an example of reducing 
minimum parking requirements in an area with good rail transit service (6). The Special 
Interest Districts (SPIDs) in Midtown Atlanta have no parking minimums. When all 
parking facilities are included in an assessment of parking ratios that have developed inside 
SPIDs since 1980-including surface lots not connected with buildings-the parking 
ratios inside the SPIDs are lower than those outside. The Atlanta case suggests, however, 
that a parking policy that focuses on just one element-minimums-may not guarantee 
that there will be changes in travel and parking behavior. By themselves, minimums-
which aJJow flexibility in choosing the number of spaces to be provided-do not 
necessarily result in lower parking ratios. The relatively low ratios inside the Atlanta 
SPIDs may be the result of unique factors, such as the widespread availability of very low-
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priced parking on vacant land outside the SPIDs. In addition, to enhance political 
acceptabi lity, policy-makers need to ensure that reductions in parking supply are 
accompanied by significant transit service improvements. 
The ease of administration of these changes in zoning ordinances is moderate. 
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Both maximums and minimums must be enforced, and so it is up to the municipality to 
monitor developments to make sure the standards are met. Where conditional-use permits 
are involved, it is also up to the municipality to monitor the developments to make sure 
that the minimum number of spaces has not been exceeded and that the agreed-upon 
alternative transportation programs are being provided. Ensuring compliance is easiest if 
the developer agrees to pay a fee rather than to provide the alternatives. 
Shared Parking 
The City of Portland's zoning regulations define shared parking as the "joint use of 
required parking spaces ... where two or more uses on the same or separate sites are able 
to share the same parking spaces because their demands occur at different times" ( 12). 
Typical examples of land uses that can share parking because of different peaking 
characteristics are a church and an office building, a dinner restaurant and an office 
building, a movie theater and a shopping center, a school and a recreational event. 
Effectiveness 
Shared parking facilities would have no direct impact on transit ridership. Shared 
parking may indirectly facilitate transit because the strategy would promote more compact 
and denser developments, as establishments "cluster" around their shared parking 
facilities. The higher densities would likely benefit transit. In addition, to the extent that a 
third party (e.g., a parking operator) provides the shared parking and prices it at market 
levels, this strategy would have a low to medium effect on SOV reduction. 
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Scope 
Shared parking has a fairly broad temporal and functional scope in that it does not 
target peak-hour drivers or specific types of trips and travelers. Like parking impact fees 
and changes in zoning ordinances, however, the spatial scope would be more narrow. 
Political Feasibility 
The political feasibility of shared parking is moderate to high. Developers and 
firms can benefit from shared parking because they save on monetary outlays in providing 
exclusive parking spaces. In some cases, films might benefit from increased traffic as a 
result of the shared spaces. For example, commuters parking in a dinner restauran t lot 
m.ight stop to have dinner after work before heading home. Those whom shared parking 
makes worse off include the developers, who bave to pay the additional costs associated 
with the shared-parking analysis required by most municipalities. Drivers might also be 
made worse off if shared parking supply is inadequate. Shared parking might also harm 
some finns if the strategy results in a parking shortage that makes them less competitive 
with other films. 
The revenues that result from shared parking come from the additional fees paid by 
developers; city officials use these fees to finance the review process. There are probably 
not enough excess revenues to be funneled into compensating the few whom this strategy 
might negatively impact. 
Shared parking may restrict parking supply and may thus facilitate compact 
development; it may also fuel centralization of activities. Spillover parking onto 
unmetered on-street spaces may also follow, if shared parking results in inadequate 
parking of off-street supply. 
Efficiency 
Shared parking, like parking impact fees and changes in zoning ordinances, may 
stimulate a more efficient supply of parking, thus enhancing economic efficiency. On the 
other hand, the strategy is broad in temporal and functional scope and may result in 
Bianco, M.J., K.J. Dueker, J.G. Strathman 2J 
spillover parking if supply proves inadequate. As stated above, if shared parking were to 
be provided by a third party and priced at market levels, this may mitigate inefficiencies 
due to free or below-market pricing. Thus, shared parking has a moderate efficiency 
rating. 
Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration 
There are several institutional barriers to shared parking within the current 
regulatory environment, and thus, the ease of administration for implementing shared 
parking under current conditions is rated as low to moderate. 
The Portland city code, for instance, requires developers to submit a multitude of 
documentation to the Bureau of Planning as part of the building permit application or land 
review process for shared parking. It also requires an analysis showing that the peak 
parking times of the uses occur at different times and that the parking area will be large 
enough for the anticipated demands of all uses. Aside from the burden of paying for this 
analysis, there are other barriers. One is the land review process, which can attach 
conditions (such as shared parking) to a current development proposal , but cannot attach 
conditions to existing adjacent land uses-that is, it cannot require adjacent developments 
to participate in the shared parking aITangement. 
Transportation Demand Management 
The transportation demand management (TDM) policies that this report considers 
are satellite parking-shuttle lots, preferential parking for carpoolers, and transit-incentive 
programs. These are typically implemented by large employers or transportation 
management associations (TMAs). TMAs are private enterprises, most commonly found 
outside of central cities, which charge employers and firms a fee to provide a variety of 
transpo1tation-related services, such as shuttles, chi ld care, carpool matching, and bicycle 
amenities. 
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A satellite parking-shuttle lot approach would involve an employer or TMA 
furnishing an off-site parking lot and transportation to and from the lol to the main 
destination. This strategy differs, however, from the more formal park-and-ride lot that is 
typically located at a large distance from the traveler's destination and is operated in 
conjunction with the regional transit provider. 
Preferential parking for carpoolers involves employers converting a fairly large 
number of preferentially located SOV parking spaces to preferentially priced carpool 
spaces. 
Transit incentive programs are implemented by major employers and are typically 
part of a larger transportation policy either at the institution or within the region. For 
example, an employer might stimulate transit use by not only subsidizing transit passes in 
part or in full for employees, but by giving transit commuters a "parking allowance," 
enabling them to park free for a limited number of days per month. 
These TDM approaches are included in this research not only because of their 
merit as parking strategies but because such alternatives are necessary for compensating 
those whom pricing approaches might make worse off. In other words, travelers priced 
away from SOV use will need a viable alternative, and a TDM approach such as transit 
incentives can provide that. 
Effectiveness 
Of the three TDM strategies, satellite parking-shuttle lots would probably have the 
lowest impact on SOV and transit share, as they would not encourage mode shift. Rather, 
they are more of a mechanism for managing on-site parking supply and demand. 
Preferential parking for carpoolers is likely to have a low to moderate impact on SOV use, 
depending on how high the price for SOV spaces becomes. It is not likely to have any 
positive impact on transit share, however, as there is no incentive for travelers to choose 
transit over carpooling under this strategy. Transit-incentive programs are likely to have a 
somewhat higher impact on reducing SOV share and on increasing transit share, as well. 
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A combination of all three approaches may result in a moderate mode shift overall, 
although this shift is likely to be confined to the origin and destination of those commuting 
to the institutions where the strategies are implemented. 
Scope 
These three strategies are all aimed at peak-hour travelers. Thus, their temporal 
and functional scopes are narrow, while their functional scope is broad to moderate. 
Because these strategies would be applied in specific geographic locations, their spatial 
scope is narrow as well. 
Political Feasibility 
The overall political feasibility of TDM strategies is hjgh. A primary beneficiary 
from satellite parking-shuttle programs is the establishment or employer that cannot afford 
to add more parking spaces on-site. Others negatively impacted would include users of 
the satellite facility, if they considered on-site parking to be more convenient. If the cost 
of providing the facilities is more than the cost of expanding on-site parking, this strategy 
might negatively impact employers as well. 
Those who would be made better off by a strategy of preferential parking for 
carpoolers include thqse who already commute by carpool and SOV or transit commuters 
who are willing to convert to carpool commuting. All peak-hour commuters would also 
benefit from a moderate decrease in congestion. Those made worse off, on the other 
hand, would include those SOV commuters who are unwilling or unable to convert to 
carpool, while at the same time unwilling or unable to pay the premium prices for SOV 
spaces. 
Beneficiaries from a transit-incentive program would, of course, include transit 
riders. But because of moderately high reductions in SOV travel that can result from such 
a strategy, alJ peak-hour commuters would benefit from moderate decreases in congestion. 
The parking allowance element of this strategy- which allows transit users to park on 
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occasion-can result in a shortage of parking, thus negatively impacting all drivers to the 
location. 
The only one of these strategies capable of generating excess revenues is 
preferential parking for carpoolers, which would involve increasing the price of SOV 
parking. It may be possible to use some of these revenues to compensate those made 
worse off by the strategy, such as low-income drivers who are unable to carpool. 
Efficiency 
These strategies are fairly targeted in scope in the locations where they are 
implemented; that is, they are directed toward the peak-hour commuter. This contributes 
to economic efficiency, although the overall percentage of all commuters affected may not 
be very great. Long-term impacts on urban structure, if any, are minimal. Short-term 
problems, such as spillover parking, may result, but not to tbe extent expected by some of 
the other strategies. Thus, these strategies have moderate to high efficiency; this may be 
compromised, however, if high subsidies are required to support the programs. 
Implementation Issues and Ease of Administration 
There are several examples of situations in which institutions or other entities 
employ TDM strategies that include parking programs such as satellite parking and 
preferential parking for carpoolers. The study of parking policy in the eleven edge cities 
provides examples of transportation demand management. In order to meet growing 
transpo1tation needs or state mandates, an increasing number of transportation 
management associations (TMAs) are taking root in edge cities and other noncentral 
locations. A good example is Warner Center, in the Los Angeles region. Warner Center 
includes about 15 million square feet of development, mostly retail and office, with about 
40,000 employees. Its TMA is the Warner Center Transportation Management 
Organization (TMO), which provides a wide variety of services, including a midday 
shuttle, child care, computerized carpool matching, vanpool incentives, transit and rail 
pass distribution, commuter shuttles, a guaranteed ride home program, and a bicycle club. 
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Parking maximums set a cap on parking supply, although supply is still adequate enough 
to allow for free parking for 40 of the 45 largest employers. Despite the nearly ubiquitous 
free parking, SOV commuting within Warner Center has fallen from a high of 85 percent 
in 1987 to a low of 70 percent in 1994; this decline may be attributed in large prut to the 
transportation demand management programs. 
Another example of transportation demand management is that found at 
universities, as revealed by the study of pru·king procedures at universities and hospitals. 
The University of Washington, for example, implemented a transportation management 
program in 1991 to serve its 50,000 employees and students. The central feature of the 
program is the U-PASS, a highly discounted transit pass offered to those holding 
university identification cards. The program involves increased transit service, shuttle 
service, free carpool parking for holders of the U-PASS, vanpools, ridematching, bicycle 
amenities, and reimbursed ride home for transit riders. 
Prior to the program's inception at the University of Washington, transit share was 
21 percent, carpool ing IO percent, and SOV 33 percent. Walking, bicycling, and other 
modes made up the remaining 36 percent. With the program in place, transit share has 
risen to 33 percent and carpooling to 11 percent, while SOV has dropped to 23 percent. 
The remaining modes are captudng 33 percent. 
The ease of admin istration for these strategies varies. Satellite parking-shuttle lots 
are very expensive to implement. Employers or independent operators typically lease the 
fac ili ties, and the cost of leasing is highest for facil ities in or near the CBD. These 
facil ities also work best if shuttle service is both very frequent and fairly fast and if 
operators provide security at the lots. Operators will have to sustain large deficits, rely on 
generous subsidies, or pass some or all of the cost on to the commuters. If an employer is 
operating the shuttle, insurance costs must be added to the operating expenses. 
Employers might also want to bar junior employees from on-site spots and require them to 
use the remote lots. Such differentiation incurs additional administrative costs in 
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implementation and monitoring. The employer's losses in operating such a facility are 
offset only insofar as the costs of providing additional on-site parking would be higher. 
The ease of administration of this strategy is low. 
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Preferential parking for carpoolers has a moderate ease of administration. For 
preferential parking to be effective in diverting meaningful numbers of drivers to transit or 
carpool, the carpool spaces have to be signi ficantly better in terms of location, security, 
price, and other amenities (e.g., located in a covered structure) than the remaining SOY 
spaces, which drivers must therefore consider to be highly undesirable in comparison. 
Transit incentives have a moderate ease of administration. Employers need to 
identify a means for distributing free or discounted transit passes. They also need to 
determine how to manage the parking allowance, if they choose to provide it. 
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Strategy 
increasing the price of parking, based 
on a tax on revenues 
increasing the price of parking, based 
on a tax on parking spaces 
cashing-out employer provided parking 
expanding meters and accompanying 
residential permit programs 
parking impact fees 
Table 1: Assessment of Individual Parking Strategies 
See Chapter Introduction for an explanation of ratings. 







high in CBD with good transit temporal: broad 
service; lowest in suburban 
functional: broad 
low 
business districts or where transit 
service is low spatial: broad 
moderate 
temporat. narrow 
moderate functionat. narrow 
spatiat. narrow 
temporat. broad 








greater in long term to high 
spatiat. narrow 
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Efficiency Ease of 
Administration 
low to moderate moderate to high 
low low 
moderate moderate 
moderate to low to moderate 
high 
low to moderate moderate 
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Strategy 
changes in zoning ordinances to 
restrict parking supply: 
• decreased minimums 
• parking maximums 
• conditional-use permits 
shared parking 
satellite parking-shuttle lots 
preferential parking for carpoolers 
t ransit-incentive programs 
Table 6: Assessment of Individual Parking Strategies {Cont'd) 
See Chapter Introduction for an explanation of ratings. 
Effectiveness Scope Political 
Feasibility 
temporat. broad 
very low in short term; somewhat functional: moderate- moderate 












functional: narrow high 
spatial: narrow 
temporal: narrow 
low to moderate functionat. narrow high 
spatiat. narrow 
temporal: narrow 
moderate functional: narrow high 
spatial: narrow 
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Efficiency Ease of 
Administration 
low to moderate moderate 
moderate low to moderate 
moderate to 













Table 1 summarizes the assessment of the strategies discussed in this chapter. 
With the exception of the increase in the price of parking, based on spaces, all of the 
parking strategies considered here have a moderate to high degree of political feasibility. 
Most also are moderately easy to implement. Only those that are employer-specific, such 
as cashing-out and the TDM strategies, are well targeted to peak-hour travelers; the 
others, as presented here, are perhaps too broad to recommend their implementation. 
Overall , the best strategies in terms of political feasibility are parking impact fees, 
changing zoning ordinances, shared parking, and TDM approaches such as satellite 
parking-shuttle lots. The strategy with the highest level of effectiveness in changing mode 
share-increasing the price of parking, based on a tax on spaces-is also the least 
politically feasible. 
No single strategy is both effective in terms of increasing transit ridership and 
without difficulties in terms of scope, political feasibility, efficiency, and administration. 
Rather, policy-makers should implement combinations of parking strategies. Table 2 
identifies six possible combinations and the components thereof. 
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Table 2: Combination Packages by Policy Goal and Component Strategies 
encourage transit encourage transit encourage transit address parking encourage transit address parking 
ridership through ridership by ridership by problems and ridership through problems in high-
explicit parking workers who park employees and decrease SOV use explicit parking density housing 
Policy Goal pricing in areas of free in employer- users of special in suburban activity pricing in non-CBD areas susceptible to 
congested peak- leased parking generators: high- center or other commercial areas spillover parking 
hour travel and density employers noncentral area of with parking from nearby 
parking w ith limited parking growth problems commercial areas 
sunnlv 
Strateav 
increasing parking price by ++ 0 + 0 0 0 
tax on revenues <see •• below) 
cashing-out employer- + ++ + NA 0 NA 
provided parkino 
expandino on-street meters + c c + ++ + 
expanding residenUal permit + c c c c ++ 
oroorams 
parking impact fees on new c c 0 ++ NA NA 
development of parkino 
changes in zoning c c 0 ++ NA NA 
ordinances to restrict 
parkino supply 
shared oarkino c c 0 ++ ++ NA 




cash-out subsidy + + + NA 0 NA 
<see " below\ 
financing of transportation ++ + ++ ++ 0 NA 
demand manaoement /see •• belowl 
enhanced transit service ++ + ++ 0 ++ + 
lsee .. belowl 
improvements/amenities in + 0 0 0 ++ ++ 
infrastructure or (see •• below) 
transoortation svstem 
reduction of other taxes + 0 NA 0 0 0 
Combination Name Parkina Market Cashina Out Soecial Generator New Growth Benefit District Residential District 
•• special generators may increase the price of parking through internal measures, in which case the revenues may be used to finance company-sponsored compensatory mechanisms 
++ essential component + important component 0 neutral component C complementary component NA not applicable 
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These combinations should include several crucial elements: 
• combinations should take a "package" approach, so that revenue-producing 
strategies can be included to finance compensatory mechanisms for enhancing 
the political feasibility of the strategies 
• transit improvements should be an important component of each package, to 
provide a necessary alternative for drivers whom parking strategies divert from 
auto travel 
• each combination should be targeted toward a specific geographic area and a 
specific parking problem or set of problems; this is because a combination of 
strategies targeted toward the CBD, for example, is not necessarily appropriate 
for an area of new growth in the suburbs 
• just as no one single strategy is universally effective, neither is any one 
particular package of strategies in combination universaHy appropriate; thus, a 
variety of combinations should be implemented as appropriate throughout a 
region 
• groups of combination packages should work to offset spillover parking, 
strong decentralizing trends or other unintended negative consequences from 
individual strategies or other combinations 
• combination packages should be implemented on a regionwide basis, with a 
variety of combination s as appropriate for a given area or given situation 
This last point reflects one important final conclusion of this research: regardless 
of which parking strategies are chosen and implemented as part of a combination 
approach, policy-makers need to consider parking as a regional issue and part of a larger, 
comprehensive and coordinated transportation policy. 
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